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INTRODUCTION 
In the field of human rights, in order to make comparisons among states, observe 
trends over time, or even take responsive action, a means of measuring human rights 
violations is necessary. The basic questions that must be answered when describing a 
specific event where human rights may have been violated are: What happened? Who did 
what to whom? What actions were taken in response? Classification systems are 
established for answering these questions and for information management—victim vs. 
perpetrator, individual vs. state, international vs. local law. However, the definitions 
contained within these systems tend to be culturally or situationally biased. Ultimately, 
data are collected and analyzed using whatever definitions are available, but lives are 
literally at stake in these epistemological decisions. 
Arguably, every organization and state, perhaps even every person, could reach a 
different decision about the meaning its data should carry, prioritizing different facts as it 
works to craft a story of What Really Happened. The purpose of this study was to gain 
perspective on how widely these stories vary among the most well recognized human 
rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the world: Amnesty International, 
Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch. By tracing the path of similar data gathered 
in the field by all three agencies and comparing the end products—annual reports 
released to the general public—I attempt to garner insight into the intervening steps, 
where the data are analyzed and recorded in proprietary and closely guarded information 
systems. Upon finding that these NGOs’ reports do, in fact, offer varying interpretations 
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of similar “facts,” I discuss the current state of standards for data sharing among human 
rights organizations, and how well these standards do (or might) support the creation and 
maintenance of diverse interpretations. 
Current and future standards are discussed in light of two bodies of theoretical 
work. First, critiques of human rights measurement suggest a tension between offering a 
complete, generalized picture of worldwide events and a contextual, local understanding 
of individual events. Human rights NGOs attempt to collect data that can serve both 
purposes, striking a balance between abstraction and context that suits the needs and 
mission of their organization. Second, the same tension is discussed in the information 
science literature, as an epic battle between utopian and anti-utopian perspectives on 
computerization and formalization. Because the ultimate rhetorical work of human rights 
NGOs appears to be highly contextualized and idiosyncratic (based on these findings), I 
suggest that data standards created for purposes of exchange among NGOs should 
include only a few of the least contestable elements, which would allow organizations to 
add their own layers of context to the framework subsequently.
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BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
On the Problems of Human Rights Information 
Human rights gained international attention after the atrocities of World War II. 
The interest sparked by the war eventually led to the creation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a document that was approved by a consensus of 48 
nations in 1948 (Cooper, 2001). The “universality” of this document was reaffirmed at 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, where 172 states adopted the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Cerna, 1994). Today, after over half a 
century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has been translated into 
over 300 languages. 
The UDHR is comprised of over 30 articles, each affirming a different civil, 
political, social or cultural right, such as: 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. [Article 1] 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. [Article 5] 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship and observance. [Article 18] 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family. [Article 25:1] 
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) 
 
Some of these rights are rarely met by every nation that adopted the declaration; for 
example, not even in the United States does every citizen enjoy a “standard of living 
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adequate for the health and well-being of himself.” However, disputes over the 
universality of these rights do not end there. Many non-Western nations say that these so-
called “universal” rights overemphasize Western values, and particularly the rights of 
individuals over collective rights (Cerna, 1994). These arguments are especially bitter 
where cultural rights, such as religion, the status of women, and family planning, are 
concerned. For example, Article 18 guarantees the right of a person to choose and change 
his religion, which is expressly forbidden in the Muslim faith by the Koran (Cerna, 
1994). Issues of sexuality are also hotly contested. Even organizations with well defined 
internal mission statements face disagreements when they operate on a worldwide scale: 
the Latin American offices of Amnesty International, an international non-governmental 
organization, are dominated by religious conservatives who did not believe that Amnesty 
should fight to secure the release of people imprisoned because of homosexuality, 
although unjust imprisonment is one of Amnesty’s most prominent causes (Baehr, 2000). 
Even among Western democracies, differences in interpretation arise. The legality of 
abortion, for example, differs among nations that appear to support similar standards of 
rights (Baehr, 2000). 
Beyond the UDHR, then, several categories of human rights exist at varying 
levels of granularity. First, there are local laws and customs, which vary widely based on 
regional cultural norms. Second, there are international accords, which may or may not 
reflect the local values of all the signatory states. But ultimately, and most importantly, 
scholars suggest that a consensus may be emerging on abuses of what are termed “non-
derogable” rights, such as freedom from genocide, slavery, torture, and disappearances. 
Many feel that even diverse Asian and Western states “can agree on minimum standards 
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of civilized behavior” (Cerna, 1994, “The Challenge to Universality” section, ¶ 4). It is 
these non-derogable rights that most international human rights agencies are fighting to 
maintain worldwide. 
Peter Baehr, a human rights scholar and Professor Emeritus of Human Rights at 
Utrecht University, argues that the “debate [over human rights monitoring] has an 
empirical as well a [sic] strongly emotional and normative character” (2000, p. 27). The 
empirical question is to investigate whether these “universally” adopted rights are, in 
fact, generally accepted and practiced everywhere. The normative question is whether 
they should be. This paper will focus on the former, empirical question. How can one 
accurately determine whether and to what extent violations of non-derogable rights are 
occurring? 
In order to answer this question—as well as to make comparisons among states, 
observe trends over time, or even take responsive action—some means of measuring 
human rights violations is necessary. Cross-national and time-sensitive assessments can 
influence the level and type of foreign aid a state will receive, the reparations available to 
victims, and future policy changes. The basic questions that must be answered when 
describing a specific event where human rights may have been violated are: 
 
• What happened? 
• Who did what to whom? 
• What actions were taken in response? 
 
Huggins (2000) outlines two main approaches to gathering the kind of 
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information that can address these basic questions, stockpiling and storytelling. The 
difference between these is like the distinction between aggregate statistics and case 
studies, with the attendant benefits and drawbacks of each. Stockpiling “emphasizes the 
collection and dissemination of facts about atrocity” and focuses on “assembling 
statistically visible evidence on violence” and “has implications for social action” (p. 51) 
While stockpiling data is quantitative in nature and manageable, it can lead to 
homogenization, where only certain kinds of victims are counted among the statistics. 
Stockpiling is counterbalanced by storytelling, which “focuses on how people experience 
the past by producing social memory out of their everyday stories about systemic 
violence” (p. 53) While storytelling provides personal details that stockpiling misses, it 
denies that there is a power structure inherent in human rights violations, i.e., that 
perpetrators usually have more power, and are backed by political machinations that 
operate on a meta-level above the particular individuals involved. Stories come across as 
person-to-person conflicts, rather than David-and-Goliath instances of systematic state-
sponsored suppression. 
Currently, most studies and organizations attempt to answer questions about the 
presence and extent of human rights abuse using three statistical (stockpiling) 
measurements, either independently or in some combination: 
 
• Intensity describes the level of violations, or the frequency of occurrence 
• Scope describes the form of the violation, or the actual type of act that occurred 
• Range describes the person(s) affected by the event 
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Intensity is the most commonly used indicator, particularly as a means of 
comparison across contexts. Measuring intensity or frequency first requires that you 
decide what constitutes an “occurrence” of the thing you are counting. In Argentina, 
between 1976 and 1983, citizens commonly “disappeared,” or were “kidnapped by gangs 
of armed men, often in the middle of the night from their family homes. […] 
Disappearance was followed by forced removal to clandestine detention centers, 
extensive torture, and, almost always, murder” (Brysk, 1994, “Human Rights in 
Argentina” section, ¶ 2). However, the focus of post-1983 national investigations was on 
unresolved cases. Incidents where the disappeared was executed or reappeared in prison 
after many years were therefore not counted as disappearances by the government, but 
were counted by human rights agencies. The final counts of disappeared victims ranged 
from the government’s official tally of 9000 to as high as 30,000 (Brysk, 1994). 
Obviously, nuances in definition dramatically affect the eventual outcome. 
Scope, in a quantitative setting, addresses the issue of whether certain types of 
human rights crimes are worse than others, and if so, exactly how much worse. A study 
by Charles Humana (1992) attempted to address this problem in his compilation of 
human rights scores  by assigning relative weights three times higher to the seven crimes 
he considered most severe. While scholars acknowledge Humana’s work as pioneering 
and a step in the right direction (Gupta, 1994), the weighting he uses is arbitrary and 
biased by his personal and cultural history. A more recent study (Gupta, 1994) used a 
statistical technique known as discriminant analysis to “define the continuum [of abuse 
severity] with the help of the obvious cases at the extreme ends” (“Defining the 
Methodology” section, ¶ 12). The study found, for example, that torture was a better 
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predictor of a country having a poor overall human rights record than access to birth 
control. The study also found that “there is no statistical basis to support the main 
argument of the apologists of cultural relativism” (Summary, ¶ 4). In other words, the 
countries with the worst scores for the acts with the highest weight (thought to be the 
most universally “wrong") also had the worst records overall. 
Range also provokes questions about relative worth. Specifically, it can seem that 
in some cases of human rights abuse, certain types of lives count more than others. The 
crime may be considered worse depending on who has been victimized; for example, the 
recent kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl prompted widespread 
international outcry, far more than for the torture of Afghan civilians under Taliban rule. 
Some causes evoke more organized protest due to the type of victim: in the Argentinean 
case, parents and grandparents were mobilized to fight when countless children were 
kidnapped from their murdered mothers and sold into illegal adoptions. Both these cases 
aroused more anger and action than does the killing of some poor, single, adult man with 
no international prestige. When tallying the range of human rights abuses, then, questions 
of the victims’ fame and passivity may play a role. 
Not only do these three common statistical measures introduce questions of 
subjectivity, but the very notion “victimhood” does as well. In her article deconstructing 
the labels assigned to participants in human rights cases, Huggins (2000) points out that 
 
it was common in many Latin American countries for agents of the state and 
some citizens alike to distinguish between the innocent victims of system 
terror, i.e., those who had been mistakenly and/or unfairly tortured, and the 
violent activist political “subversives” who [...] presumably deserved what they 
had gotten. [emphasis mine] (“Deconstructing Status” section, ¶ 1) 
 
Deciding who fills the role of “perpetrator” is often no less clear, as demonstrated by the 
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aphorism, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” The current political 
situation between Israel and Palestine, where both states claim that the other is the 
perpetrator (of massacres in refugee camps and of terrorist bombing of civilians, 
respectively), illustrates that in many situations, the good guys and the bad guys are 
indistinguishable, or at least related. Huggins (2000) further suggests that perpetrators 
and victims should more rightly be seen as opposite ends of a continuum, and that 
perpetrators achieve status closer and closer to one extreme of that continuum through a 
series of training exercises, orders, and degradation rituals. 
Finally, the gross collection of data in itself poses a problem. With so many 
conflicting views on what constitutes a violation, how to weight the severity, and who is 
a victim, trustworthy sources are hard to come by. Many organizations rely on interviews 
with victims and their families; mainstream news and media sources; and information 
from the controlling government of the state or community being investigated. Each of 
these sources brings a potential bias to the collection of data for the statistical measure 
mentioned above, though several sources taken together might improve the 
trustworthiness of the findings through triangulation. 
Tying these delicate balancing acts together, one human rights theorist maintains: 
 
What must be avoided is a dependence on statistics alone in an area such as 
human rights, where needed data either are not available or are not meaningful 
unless interpreted within a historical and political context. (Goldstein, 1992, 
p. 54) [emphasis mine] 
 
On the Nature of Computerized Information 
The tension between context and abstraction has also played itself out in the 
information science literature, albeit in different terms. In an early treatise on the theory 
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of information, Fred Dretske (1983) argues that learning is a process of further 
abstracting and classifying those elements that we call information, so that these elements 
transcend their singular “analog” form and become “digitalized” into a composite whole 
(p. 61). This is precisely the aim of human rights agencies, which attempt to abstract 
information from beyond its local context into a more complete picture of progress and 
setbacks in human rights abuses throughout the world. Joseph Goguen (1997) 
characterizes the dichotomy differently, as a process of transcendence from “wet” to 
“dry” information. For Goguen, “wet” information is fully context sensitive, whereas 
“dry” information—or the ultimate goal of rational transcendence, objective truth—is 
fully abstracted and can be understood by anyone anywhere at any time. Both of these 
information theorists’ ideas are reminiscent of Karl Popper’s famous theory of describing 
worlds of knowledge (1972). To Popper, “world 3” is “the world of the logical contents 
of books, libraries, computer memories, and suchlike” (p. 74). World 1 is the physical 
world, and world 2 is our personal understanding of it, or our conscious experience. It is 
world 3 that constitutes objective knowledge, by which Popper means Truth with a 
capital T: world 3 is “autonomous” and its elements can exist prior to their discovery by 
humans. World 3, in a sense, is the holy grail of rationalism, a world where truth can be 
said to exist independently and eternally, an abstraction that transcends the concrete 
reality of world 1 and the bias of world 2's human comprehension. 
Within information science, there is a vigorous ongoing debate about the benefits 
and drawbacks of the “digitalizing” or “drying out” of information, particularly in 
relation to the computerization of data that was previously communicated orally or in 
writing. Rob Kling (1996) characterizes the debate as a battle between utopian and anti-
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utopian narratives of computerization. The utopian “story” works to promote the project 
of transcendence toward dry information and toward Truth. From this viewpoint, which is 
largely accepted by most organizations, computerization is progress, in and of itself: 
more abstract and more formalized means more efficient and closer to the truth. Other 
researchers are creating an anti-utopian story, in which abstraction leads not to 
enlightenment and productivity but to alienation. Theorist Mark Poster (1990) offers 
perhaps the darkest anti-utopian vision, arguing that computerization allows us to 
transcend the usual constraints of space and time. In Poster's mind, though, such 
transcendence serves only to strain the representative relationship between words and the 
things they signify, so that the subjects of electronic databases are disembodied, 
subverted, and ultimately dehumanized. Murphy (2000) offers a sociologist’s perspective 
on the field of computerization, claiming that computer space is meant to be a 
disembodied region where complexities and interpretation are reduced or eliminated. 
However, Murphy believes that this approach cannot hold: computerized information 
cannot and should not escape the contamination of perception and language. 
As with many debates, the solution may lie somewhere in between. 
Computerization, especially coupled with standards for data storage, can support more 
efficient communication and decrease workloads on individual organizations. However, 
the worries of the anti-utopians cannot be dismissed lightly, particularly in a context-
sensitive field like human rights, where the work is about real people in real pain in 
highly idiosyncratic situations. The wet-dry debate of information science is reminiscent 
of the storytelling-stockpiling debate suggested by Huggins (2000), and the struggle, by 
whatever name, plays out in the daily work of human rights NGOs. 
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THE INFORMATION PRACTICES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS 
Despite these ambiguities, organizations still attempt to collect statistics and tell 
stories about human rights abuses, in the hopes that all humans will eventually enjoy at 
least a minimum standard of safety. But what data practices do human rights NGOs 
actually use to do this? How do they place the data they gather into an appropriate 
context, in order to evoke appropriate responses? HURIDOCS, a decentralized global 
network dedicated to increasing the efficiency and capacity of human rights information 
work, developed a model (Figure 1) to explain the flow of information within a human 
rights NGO (Dueck, Guzman, & Verstappen, 2001). 
 
Figure 1. 
Model of information flow in a human rights organization (from Dueck et al 2001, p. 22) 
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The model includes six steps: intake of initial information, fact-finding, analysis to arrive 
at findings, organizing and recording, analysis of trends and patterns, and intervention 
and communication. According to the model, the first three steps typically occur in 
chronological order; the final three steps may happen simultaneously and cyclically. At 
every stage, from gathering to final analysis, some information that is seen to be 
important is kept and propagated, while other bits are lost or dropped. What eventually 
remains, while ostensibly empirical data from a trusted authority source, carries implicit 
value judgments. Some researchers have suggested that sharing data gathered from 
different sources may result in a more complete (and perhaps less biased?) picture: 
 
Major improvement in our knowledge of human rights abuses could be obtained 
if those social scientists who are interested in empirically studying this 
phenomena would [...] cooperate more closely together in developing 
comprehensive data sets. (McNitt, 1988, p. 99) 
 
HURIDOCS attempts to facilitate this kind of data sharing through the use of 
electronic standards for recording human rights information. Its Events Standard Formats 
(Dueck et al., 2001; Dueck, Guzman, Verstappen, & Cifuentes, 2000) help organizations 
share computerized human rights data after it has been recorded, in order to disperse the 
burden of fact-finding and increase the speed and accuracy of communication. 
Theoretically, it might be possible to follow the evolution of human rights 
information as it traces a path from initial fact-finding to final communication to the 
public within a single organization. Practically, however, this is not entirely feasible. For 
political and security reasons, most human rights organizations are willing to publicly 
share information about only some parts of their information management processes. In 
order to gain credibility and authority with their audiences, most NGOs offer at least a 
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rudimentary description of their fact-finding methods. They are, of course, willing to 
share a great deal of information at the end of the process (steps 5 and 6): for many 
organizations, the final communication products, in the form of press releases, letter-
writing campaigns, and annual reports, are the bread and butter of their work. But what 
happens in between? In fact, the two middle steps of the information flow described 
above amount to a “black box” for the outside observer. Practices related to steps three 
and four of the model are closely guarded among human rights NGOs; access to their 
documentation must necessarily be limited to protect the confidentiality of their 
informants, the security of their records, and the continuation of their work. 
Since the middle steps cannot be directly observed, the next best approach is to 
triangulate from what data are available—to describe the middle by starting from both 
ends. In the remainder of this paper, I will analyze publicly available documents about 
the gathering and disseminating phases of human rights NGOs in order to infer more 
about the nature of this “black box” and the kinds of computerized information systems 
that might support the recording of human rights data. The HURIDOCS model of human 
rights information management will be used as a framework to examine inputs and 
outcomes for the three best known human rights agencies operating on an international 
scale: Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch. Initial research 
has indicated that intake and fact-finding practices (steps 1 and 2) happen more or less 
similarly across these human rights NGOs. Given that the agencies start from similar 
points, I will analyze instances of communication and analysis of trends (steps 5 and 6) 
from each agency, in order to make predictions about the analysis of findings and 
organizing/recording (steps 3 and 4). Specifically, I will discuss the following questions: 
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1. The relationship between fact-finding practices and outcomes for human rights 
NGOs. What do the relationships imply about organization and recording (since 
we cannot directly examine these practices)? 
2. The Events Standard Formats for organization and recording supplied by 
HURIDOCS. Do the formats support the varied outcomes evident in the discourse 
of individual NGOs? How could they be improved? 
Methods 
This study is a case study in scope. The three NGOs chosen for study are the best 
known human rights agencies operating on an international scale: Amnesty International 
(AI), Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch (HRW). 
 
Amnesty International (AI) was founded in 1961 by British lawyer Peter 
Benenson. Today the organization has more than one million members, 
subscribers and regular donors in more than 140 countries. Its nerve centre is the 
International Secretariat in London, with more than 410 staff members and over 
120 volunteers from more than 50 countries around the world. (Amnesty 
International, 2000, ¶ 3) 
 
Freedom House is a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world. 
Founded nearly sixty years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie, and 
other Americans concerned with the mounting threats to peace and democracy, 
Freedom House has been a vigorous proponent of democratic values and a 
steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the far left and the far right. (Freedom 
House, 2000, ¶ 1) 
 
Human Rights Watch started in 1978 as Helsinki Watch, to monitor the 
compliance of Soviet bloc countries with the human rights provisions of the 
landmark Helsinki Accords. In the 1980’s, Americas Watch was set up to counter 
the notion that human rights abuses by one side in the war in Central America 
were somehow more tolerable than abuses by the other side. The organization 
grew to cover other regions of the world, until all the “Watch” committees were 
united in 1988 to form Human Rights Watch. (Human Rights Watch, 2002a ¶ 3) 
 
For each NGO, two kinds of content were analyzed: statements from the agencies’ 
publications about their fact-finding practices, and publicly available annual reports on 
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the state of human rights in individual countries. Additionally, I analyzed the structure 
and organization of information within the standard format for events developed by 
HURIDOCS, an umbrella organization working, in part, to develop data standards for the 
dissemination and sharing of information related to specific human rights violations. 
Fact-finding practices: Information about fact-finding practices was most 
commonly drawn from the Frequently Asked Questions section on the websites of the 
NGOs I studied. Some secondary sources on Amnesty International were also available 
and included in the analysis. While observation would have been the ideal method to 
learn about fact-finding practices, the FAQs from each agency can be seen as a kind of 
self-reporting method. Because the NGOs describe their methods in order to build 
accountability and credibility (in other words, to convince a sometimes skeptical public 
that their work is valid), one can assume that what they report is largely truthful and 
complete. Additionally, using FAQs allowed me to expand the range of the study, instead 
of limiting myself only to those countries and NGOs in which I had observed fact-finding 
practices. 
Annual reports: Discourse analysis was used to examine several sections of 
annual reports from the three NGOs. As a method, discourse analysis is qualitative and 
highly particularistic, but my aim was to look for systematic patterns (similarities and 
differences) in the way that human rights organizations represented their work and 
situations of abuse. Over repeated readings of the text, I developed and refined categories 
of intention and purpose that were supported in the narratives of each group’s 
construction of the facts. 
The annual reports cover events from 2001 in countries around the world. 
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Sections related to five countries were chosen for analysis, including Argentina, China, 
Israel, Kenya, and the UK. The countries vary along several dimensions, such as 
geographic location, religion, ethnicity, level of democratization, and relationship with 
Western nations; however, the sample is not meant to be fully representative of all 
nations or of all discourse from these NGOs. The sections analyzed comprised 
approximately 11,000 words each from Amnesty International and Freedom House and 
19,000 from Human Rights Watch (over half of which were devoted to China and Israel). 
Reports from the U.S. Department of State were considered for inclusion as a 
counterpoint, but I believe that the work of NGOs is qualitatively different because they 
purport to be impartial, i.e., not tied to a state or a political organization. The goal was to 
see if differences exist among the discourses of organizations that could arguably be 
considered similar in nature. 
Annual reports were chosen as the unit of analysis because they represent what is 
probably the most “distilled” form of human rights measurement available. Additionally, 
annual reports are one of the few forms of communication that all three agencies shared 
in common. The reports contain only what is left after every imaginable step of data 
filtering and analysis has been completed. An alternative analysis might have used 
statistical tables, but I chose reports because I am specifically interested in how these 
organizations craft compelling and persuasive stories. In what ways do they characterize 
nations, government officials, and victims (i.e., present them as characters or actors)? 
What trends do they argue are evident in the data from each country? In other words, how 
do they enact the last steps of the HURIDOCS model? 
Events Standard Formats: In analyzing the content of the Events Standard 
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Formats (ESFs) for human rights violations outlined by HURIDOCS, I used two sources: 
(1) the manual describing the formats in detail (Dueck et al., 2001), and (2) a freeware 
Microsoft Access program distributed by HURIDOCS that implements the ESFs in 
database form (Dueck et al., 2000). The analysis involved classifying the data elements 
according to whether they were qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative elements were 
those that allowed free text entry; all other items were labeled as quantitative in some 
form or another. For example, elements that exploited various controlled vocabularies 
through the use of menus were considered to be categorical quantitative data. The 
qualitative elements were analyzed for the length of the available entry space. The 
quantitative elements were further examined to determine the type of authority control, if 
any, provided by the system. 
Limitations: As noted above, the primary limitation of this study is that I could 
not directly examine the analysis and recording practices at the headquarters of Amnesty 
International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch, due to time and security 
constraints. However, I believe that reverse-engineering the processes (so to speak) by 
looking at the variation in inputs and outcomes for a controlled range of settings was the 
best available alternative. As a case study, the study is also limited in its scope. The 
results could be bolstered by studying other kinds of communication products (e.g., news 
briefs) and including other NGOs and government agencies of varying size and purpose. 
The cases selected, though, provide a strong indication that such an extensive 
investigation is worth undertaking. 
I did not determine the extent to which the HURIDOCS Events Standard Formats 
are used in the three NGOs I studied; my tentative guess is that they are not used widely 
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throughout these agencies’ global networks, but might be used in smaller local NGOs that 
lack significant information management experience. In any case, the intent of this study 
was not to analyze the actual impact of these particular standards on the practices of 
these particular NGOs, but to characterize the middle steps of the information flow model 
in a general way, and then to examine how one example of a current data standard 
engages that theoretical characterization. Therefore, the paper should not be read as a 
critique of how well the ESFs suit the purposes of these three organizations; instead, it is 
an examination of how computerized formats might generally support the rhetorical 
transformations to which human rights organizations subject their data. 
Gathering Information 
The first two steps in the HURIDOCS model of human rights information 
management are “Intake of Initial Information” and “Fact-Finding,” or what I will 
together call gathering. AI, HRW, and Freedom House all use several diverse sources to 
gain the most complete picture of a human rights situation. All three agencies interview 
informants in the countries they investigate; all three also rely on published materials and 
interviews from other human rights organizations, local newspapers, and government 
sources. AI, however, is one of the only NGOs that attends the trials of the people it 
investigates (Poe, Carey, & Wazquez, 2001). 
On the surface, fact-finding practices do not appear to vary much among these 
organizations, all of which operate on a global scale and under extreme time pressures. 
The information gathered includes individual testimony from victims, additional 
testimony from human rights experts and investigators, popular and trade publications, 
legal and legislative proceedings, and even (perhaps especially) state-sanctioned 
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messages (Amnesty International, 2003; Freedom House, 2002a; Freedom House, 2002b; 
Human Rights Watch, 2002a). Due to the limitations of the data, it would be impossible 
to state that the fact-finding practices are identical. However, with the exceptions of the 
trials of victims, the three NGOs report similar categories of practice: they monitor the 
same kinds of sources and interview the same kinds of individuals. 
Analyzing Trends and Disseminating Information 
Given that steps 1 and 2, intake and fact-finding, appear to be largely similar 
among the three organizations, my investigation turned to the output at steps 5 and 6. 
What becomes of the data at the other end of the cycle, after it has been processed, 
filtered, and reconstructed to fit preferred forms of communication? How do the 
organizations weave an enormous number of disparate facts into a cohesive narrative?  
Before describing the differences among the reports, the common threads should 
be highlighted. First, the three organizations all use a combination of the three standard 
violations measurements, intensity, scope and range. Each agency addressed the scope of 
problems in each country by presenting reports of numerous types of violations, often 
explicitly broken out by category. Intensity tended to be addressed within these specific 
categories, rather than across categories or on a country-wide level: 
 
Around 200 Falun Gong practitioners allegedly died in custody as a result of 
torture. (Amnesty International, 2002) 1 
 
A survey carried out by a women's rights group states that more than 49 women 
were murdered by their spouses in 1998 alone, a 79 percent increase in cases 
since 1995. (Freedom House & Karatnycky, 2002) 
 
Finally, the range of victims of all three organizations included activists, political figures, 
journalists, and everyday citizens. They varied in the prominence given to the stories 
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surrounding different kinds of figures—Amnesty International emphasizes the “little 
guy” more so than its counterparts, for example—but they do all attempt to paint a 
picture of violations and victims that are systemic, from the vocal minority of famous 
victims who are likely to be noticed and persecuted, to the innocent unknowns trying in 
vain to live non-politicized lives. 
Also, all three NGOs call on a discourse of innocence when it comes to civilians, 
giving the populace the benefit of the doubt. Descriptions of demonstrations and other 
forms of civil disobedience are most commonly preceded by the word “peaceful": “Police 
used violence to disperse peaceful demonstrations by human rights groups, opposition 
politicians, environmental activists and others” (Amnesty International, 2002). This is 
true even when the events are surrounded by violence; in its China report, for example, 
Freedom House offers the bizarre and discordant account, “Most Uighur independence 
activities appear to be peaceful, although armed groups have carried out several 
bombings and assassinations” (Freedom House & Karatnycky, 2002). The NGOs, as 
might also be true of mass media in democratized nations, seem more willing to play up 
the violent reactions of police and the military than to question the intent or nature of 
civilian measures. 
When such measures are questionable, outside causes are provided as explanatory 
mechanisms. Here, for example, Freedom House maintains that widespread rioting in 
Argentina was in fact caused by a fiscal policy decision: 
 
De la Rua ordered that limits on cash withdrawals from banks be established to 
stop a run on Argentina’s banking system, but the move sparked widespread 
protests. Within days, massive spontaneous demonstrations by housewives from 
the middle class—the most important sector of the government coalition’s base—
were joined by the rioting and looting of supermarkets in poorer districts around 
the country […]. (Amnesty International, 2002) 
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At worst, citizens are “stone-throwing demonstrators” (Human Rights Watch, 2002b); 
even then, police fire on them and kill a thirteen-year-old boy. Citizens may be associated 
with violence, but they do not share in its perpetuation without provocation. Rather, 
violence is thrust upon them. 
This points to a larger underlying (and unstated) agreement among the NGOs: 
human rights violations cannot be committed by a person (unless she is serving in an 
official capacity) or even by a group of people. By definition, human rights violations are 
problems of systems and officialdom, not of the populace. In other words, the race riots 
themselves aren’t the violation; the government’s inability to prevent or contain them is. 
 
In the wake of Britain’s worst race riots and disturbances since 1985, which took 
place in several cities in England, Amnesty International warned that the 
government must actively tackle racism at all levels of society. (Amnesty 
International, 2002) 
 
Later in this example, Amnesty International again goes out of its way to find 
explanations within the system for violence committed by groups not connected to the 
system (emphasis mine): 
 
In April the Racial and Violent Crimes Unit of the Metropolitan Police said that 
racist attacks increased whenever politicians made inflammatory statements 
about asylum-seekers. (Amnesty International, 2002) 
 
In the same paragraph, AI condemns “documented cases of discriminatory practices in 
relation to deaths in police custody” (Amnesty International, 2002). Racist attacks 
committed by police are condemnable violations, but racist attacks committed by the 
general population are the fault of politician’s flapping jaws. 
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Finally, while the typical human rights violation is primarily an act of 
commission—some barbarous action against humanity—all three NGOs also called a 
discourse of omission into play throughout their texts. In their view, old cases left 
unresolved or the failure to prevent a crime can be considered a violation. 
 
The Court found that procedures for investigating the use of lethal force by the 
security forces failed to meet the requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It criticized the lack of independence of the investigating police 
officers from the officers implicated; the lack of reasons given for failure to 
prosecute; the lack of public scrutiny; the lack of information provided to the 
victims’ families by the authorities; and defects in the inquest procedure […]. 
(Amnesty International, 2002) 
 
Finding Differences 
The common elements described above are woven throughout narratives that, at 
first glance, appear to espouse the same notions of human rights. In truth, though, the 
reports carry great differences that are visible only upon closer inspection. Four main 
characteristics of difference emerged from my analysis: voice, ideal of freedom, frame, 
and outlook (see Table 1). 
Voice is akin to what in literature might be called “genre” or “mood.” It describes 
the overall tone of the discourse, or (at a higher level of abstraction) the literary tradition 
that it most resembles. Ideal of freedom is, in some respects, the guiding beacon of the 
discourse. Of all the violations recounted, which are the worst or the most prominently 
featured, and upon what basic freedom(s) are those worst violations infringing? Frame 
refers to the scope of understanding each NGO applies to events: are they stockpiling or 
storytelling, as Huggins (2000) describes? Do they refer to outside forces for context and 
explanation, or do they simply let the reporting of each violation stand on its own? 
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Finally, outlook describes the mind-set of each organization as it relates to progress and 
positive change in the countries, either potential or realized. 
Table 1. 
Characteristics of difference in the discourse of human rights NGOs 
Characteristic Amnesty Freedom House HR Watch 
Voice Tragic Historical Journalistic 
Ideal of freedom Body Choice Information 
Frame Storytelling Stockpiling Mixed 
Outlook Skeptical Optimistic Detached 
 
Amnesty International: Violently Romantic 
All quotes within this section are taken from (Amnesty International, 2002) unless 
otherwise indicated. 
The annual country reports of Amnesty International (AI) are organized by type 
of offense, in bullet point or catalog style: Death penalty, Police, Torture and ill-
treatment, etc. Some elements appear in nearly every country, such as torture and ill-
treatment, whereas some are specific to a given situation, such as a Northern Ireland 
subheading for the UK report. The offenses generally have to do with bodily injury, 
including torture, prison conditions, and executions; AI’s most basic and important 
notion of freedom appears to be freedom from bodily harm, as will be demonstrated in 
the excerpts that follow. While AI does cover some civil and political liberties, such as 
freedom of speech, labor rights, and asylum, the bulk of its reports are devoted to violent, 
physically injurious events. 
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Illustrative cases are provided for each type of offense, called out into separate 
paragraphs punctuated by asterisks. These callouts are all the more visceral because they 
are juxtaposed with detached facts and aggregate claims, making the overall work of 
Amnesty International seem like a valiant crusade. The back-and-forth narrative tactic 
gives the text a villains-and-heroes rhythm, where the protagonists reflect archetypal 
literary notions of romantic and epic tragedies. The narratives also convey a deep sense 
of looking inward, to the plight of one person, for the fullest understanding of a situation. 
These constitute AI’s tragic style and storytelling frame of understanding. 
 
There were numerous allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the ISA. Victims 
included Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the Occupied 
Territories. Many of the latter were held in prolonged incommunicado detention 
for 20 days and sometimes for up to 70 days. 
* Muna ‘Ubayd, a teacher and a Palestinian citizen of Israel, was arrested in 
August. She was held for 27 days in solitary detention in the Petah Tikva 
Detention Centre, apparently suspected of having had contacts with Hizbullah. 
During her interrogation she was reportedly manacled or tied to a chair, her 
blouse was pulled and she was thrown several times against the wall.  
 
Amnesty International also appears more likely to name a single victim than a 
single perpetrator, naming only 12 individual officials versus 62 individual victims across 
all the reports. This, again, helps the audience to identify more strongly with the known 
victim than with the faceless, Kafkaesque state (or paramilitary group). Each statistic 
reported, whether an aggregate count or a blank, emotionless assertion, is punctuated by 
the symbolic plight of one person. Note below how Zhang Min’s personal story stands in 
stark contrast to allegations of wrongdoing by “authorities” and “officials.” 
 
The campaign against groups branded as ‘‘heretical organizations’’ continued. 
There was mounting evidence that the authorities were permitting the use of 
violence against Falun Gong practitioners as one of the means to eradicate the 
group. […]  
* Zhang Min, a Falun Gong practitioner from Yilan county, Heilongjiang 
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province, was reportedly arrested on 5 December for handing out Falun Gong 
leaflets. She died six days later, after police reportedly tortured her. Officials 
reportedly told her family that she had died of a heart attack, although she had no 
previous history of heart disease.  
 
A somewhat skeptical tone is pervasive throughout Amnesty International’s 
reports. Stories about positive events are interwoven throughout the violent narratives, 
often nearly de-emphasized. AI is working for the release of prisoners, but does not 
necessarily see a release as a cause for celebration. Here, for example, a release is briefly 
noted, followed immediately by allegations of the wrongdoing that occurred during the 
victim’s time in prison. 
 
* Cao Maobing, a labour activist at a silk factory in Funing, was released in July 
after seven months’ detention in Yancheng No. 4 Psychiatric Hospital. He 
alleged that he was forcibly given drugs and electric shocks. He was detained at 
the hospital after he led a strike and talked to foreign journalists.  
 
In fact, most of the positive events that AI recounts, unlike its negative stories, are not 
about individual victims. Items that are characterized positively are in fact more likely to 
be stories about words and policy, e.g., press statements and court rulings. 
 
In a landmark decision, Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo ruled in March that the 
Full Stop and Due Obedience laws, which granted immunity from prosecution 
for human rights violations committed under the military government, were 
unconstitutional and void.  
 
Given that AI spends so much time hammering home the plight of individuals, 
announcing only policy changes as positive leaves the reader feeling a bit empty; the laws 
are changing, sure, but whatever happened to that father of three who has been 
imprisoned and tortured since 1993? These last points contribute to an overall skeptical 
and pessimistic outlook. Such an outlook assumes that there will always be more work 
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to do, that even when prisoners are released and laws struck down, some other wrong has 
not been redressed. AI’s strategy is to emphasize systemic evil and contrast it against 
individual suffering, as if to garner the most emotional reactions—and possibly to 
instigate action—from its readers. 
Freedom House: History in Action 
All quotes within this section are taken from (Freedom House & Karatnycky, 
2002) unless otherwise indicated. 
The Freedom House reports are each presented in two sections: political 
background (what they call “Overview") and “Political Rights and Civil Liberties.” In the 
latter, Freedom House seems to draw a higher proportion of its descriptions of direct 
human rights violations from other sources; for example, they cite a 2001 report by 
Human Rights in China in stating that “criminal defense lawyers ‘are often harassed and 
intimidated […] merely for actively defending the interests of their clients.’” However, 
the group’s description of political background rarely quotes outside sources, drawing 
instead from its own work and measurements. 
Freedom House pays great attention to economic issues in its reports, describing 
issues that are important from a Western capitalist perspective, e.g., privatization, 
welfare, foreign debt, corruption. 
 
Record unemployment, reduced and delayed wages to federal and provincial 
workers, and the closing of public schools have created the kind of social 
mobilization and protests unseen for nearly a generation.  
 
The reports are rather holistic, noticeably more so than AI’s. Well-being for Freedom 
House must include social issues like health care and education in addition to economics 
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and politics. 
 
Some one million Arab citizens (roughly 19 percent of the population) receive 
inferior education, housing, and social services relative to the Jewish population.  
 
Labour achievements such as devolution, House of Lords reform, a stable 
economy, low unemployment, and improvements in primary education were 
overshadowed by criticism of the government’s failure to deliver on its key 
promise to revive public services. After years of underinvestment, 
transportational systems are in disrepair, secondary schools are substandard, and 
the National Health Service is ill-equipped to handle its workload.  
 
Also in contrast to AI, Freedom House makes far less commotion about crimes against 
the body, particularly when it comes to individuals. Freedom House mentions only four 
individual victims by name throughout all five reports, and even the most violent 
incidents are described only in understated and impersonal terms. 
 
Israelis experienced a pronounced decline in personal security in 2001. Over 100 
Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorist attacks. Islamic radicals and other 
Palestinian militants staged suicide bombings, ambushes, and car bombings, 
eroding the public’s freedom of movement.  
 
Instead, Freedom House adopts a much grander narrative style, much like reading 
a history book. Its reports provide something like the lay of the land—as if, in studying a 
still-life painting, the overall image, the artist’s methods, and the historical context were 
fully described, but very few details were provided about specific objects within the 
picture (e.g., you wouldn’t learn how many petals are on one flower or another). Every 
report covers far more time than just the year in question. The Israel report, for example, 
covers major political events and Israeli-Palestinian relations since 1948, discussing how 
“Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor-led coalition government secured a breakthrough 
agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993” in order to 
explain what happened in the peace process during 2001. In each report, fully half of the 
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text is devoted to “Overview,” or the historical precedents for the human rights issues 
that are discussed in the last half. Freedom House’s analyses are contextually referent, 
presented from the perspective of looking back on something almost as it happens, 
striving to place the current situation and recent events within an existing framework or 
(infra)structure. The analyses are not, however, the plights of individuals; Freedom 
House’s basic approach is stockpiling, or making general (if not always quantitative) 
statements about the state of affairs. 
As such, the reports place great importance on the ascent to power of current and 
recent heads of state, as if to ask: how did this all come to pass? “Juan Peron’s 
authoritarian rule in 1955” and Carlos Menem’s “six-year presidential term in 1989, 
amidst hyperinflation and food riots” are mentioned as influential political 
predeterminants of Argentina’s current political situation and leadership. Additionally, 
leaders tend to be mentioned in fairly neutral terms, rather than directly in conjunction 
with systematic violations or oppression: 
 
A former Shanghai mayor and party boss, Jiang became state president in 1993 
and was widely recognized as China’s new paramount leader following Deng’s 
1997 death.  
 
Unlike the other groups, Freedom House uses names of individuals for their historical 
context, not for assigning blame as perpetrators or for symbolizing injustice as victims. 
Freedom House covers a veritable checklist of content, primarily concerned with 
whether people basically have the freedom to choose how to live their lives—or in other 
words, whether they have traditional political rights and civil liberties, as the title of the 
second half of each report suggests. The ability to democratically elect leadership, the 
freedom to publish and read media that is not state-sponsored or state-censored, and the 
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right to publicly exercise the religion of one’s choice are three of many such rights that 
are systematically reported for each country. 
Finally, Freedom House carries a more optimistic stance in its reports than either 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Both the negative and positive reports 
are stated in general rather than individual terms, creating a better one-for-one balance. 
The reader can more easily reconcile the weight of a good policy against a bad one than 
they can reconcile a good policy shift against a person’s daily struggle in prison (as in 
AI’s reports). Additionally, the group plays up positive events by immediately tempering 
bad news, following it with good news wherever possible. 
 
Despite Kenya’s history of authoritarian rule, many basic elements necessary for 
the development of a democratic political system exist. Opposition parties are 
active and vocal. Parliament is the setting for much of the nation’s political 
discourse. A varied and energetic civil society plays an important role in public 
policy debates. 
 
Suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Haifa, and other attacks in late November 
and the first half of December killed dozens of people, forcing Palestinian leader 
Yasir Arafat to declare and enforce a cease-fire which significantly damped 
down the violence for the rest of the year.  
 
Contrast this last statement with AI’s version, in which “a number of attempted cease-
fires failed” (Amnesty International, 2002). Although Freedom House mentions violence 
first and the improvement—which AI claims to be nonexistent—is the note on which 
they end. Overall, they seem to say, things may be bad, but they are getting better. 
Human Rights Watch: The Rest of the Story 
All quotes within this section are taken from (Human Rights Watch, 2002b) 
unless otherwise indicated. 
The Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports are similar to those of Freedom House 
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in that they try to capture the entire scope of a country’s situation, including a bit of 
recent history and a great deal of politics and policy. However, they also use some of the 
same tools as Amnesty International: they are more likely than Freedom House to use 
specific instances and the stories of individuals as a narrative hook (if not as an emotional 
bludgeon). The text is laced with instances of specific violations, but they are not visually 
distinguished as AI’s bullet-pointed stories are. In this sense, they are more illustrative 
than symbolic. 
This man-on-the-street perspective, counterbalanced by the full background of the 
story, is common in journalistic writing, and indeed, this is the stylistic sense one gets 
from reading the HRW reports. They describe policy developments and other human 
rights concerns in much the same way a newspaper or magazine might. 
 
At least sixteen people were arrested or sentenced in 2001 for using the Internet 
to send information or express views that the leadership disliked. Four others 
were tried at the end of September on charges of subversion for organizing a new 
youth organization and publishing articles about political reform. As of mid-
November, there was still no information available on the outcome of Huang 
Qi’s secret trial in August 2001. Huang was charged with subversion for 
featuring articles about democracy on his website.  
 
For HRW, the most prominently featured freedoms involve information and 
words. Freedom is characterized first as the right to access information or speak your 
mind, and second, as the absence of laws, decrees, and or even press statements that hint 
at limiting these rights (apparently because such statements indicate the thinking that 
drives the policy-makers). 
 
In December 2000, Guangdong’s publicity bureau told newspapers and journals 
not to publish articles by eleven prominent scholars. In June 2001, one of those 
named, economist He Qinglian, fearing imminent arrest, fled China.  
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More than the other two organizations, HRW includes and features the operation of 
NGOs and human rights advocates in each country, particularly the obstruction of their 
operation. Here again, the obstructions may also be characterized in terms of words and 
threats as opposed to actual violence. 
 
In March, President Moi warned Kenyans to be wary of NGOs “pretending to 
fight for human rights,” accusing “con men who have formed NGOs calling 
themselves human rights activists,” of wanting to “destabilize the country” and to 
“cause confusion through foreign-funded seminars.”  
 
However, the discourse of HRW seems to be, more than anything, chameleon-like in its 
ability to adapt to the nature of the country it describes. What is truly emphasized differs 
from country to country. In Argentina, the focus is resolving cases of “disappearance” 
and continued police brutality. In China, the issue is government-induced conformity of 
press and religion, as well as violence against ethnic minorities. The main Israeli and 
Kenyan issues are the Palestinian conflict and government corruption, respectively. 
Finally, the UK report focuses on the government’s imposition on civil liberties in 
response to the September 11 attacks, as well as the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Each of these situations, though, is primarily analyzed with respect to government 
policy and transparency—with respect to information. More emphasis appears to be 
given to the stance of the country than to what actually happens as a result of those 
stances. For example, in the case of China’s “Strike Hard” campaign, Amnesty 
International stresses the meteoric rise in executions following the campaign’s 
implementation; Freedom House stresses the disproportionate response of executing 
nonviolent offenders; HRW, by contrast, stresses the words of the president himself 
before mentioning the effects of the campaign. 
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On April 3, 2001, President Jiang initiated a three-month Strike Hard (yan da) 
campaign. Stressing the need to safeguard social stability and the reform process, 
he asked that improvements in fighting crime be made with “two tough hands.” 
The campaign featured hastily processed cases, denial of due process rights, 
summary trials, harsh sentences, mass sentencing rallies, and an upsurge in 
executions.  
 
Also, HRW is the most likely group to actually name the people taking steps for 
or against a particular human rights violation. As mentioned above, they name individual 
victims as much as Amnesty International does; in contrast, though, they implicate 
individual government officials as perpetrators, directly tying an official to the system he 
represents. Note in the first excerpt below how the culpability for the act of declaring a 
“state of emergency” is placed squarely on the shoulders of David Blunkett himself, 
rather than the British Home Office. The second statement recounts how two particular 
officials explicitly supported groups undermining human rights, even without necessarily 
taking action themselves. 
 
On November 12, Home Secretary David Blunkett declared a “state of 
emergency,” a requirement for derogation from certain provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In a speech in March at a military ceremony in Córdoba, Defense Minister 
Jaunarena contended that the prolongation of the trials was not beneficial for 
anyone, neither for the victims nor for those who might be accused. Jaunarena’s 
predecessor as defense minister, Ricardo López Murphy, supported the army 
when, in the same month, 663 officers in active service presented a habeas data 
demand against CELS, demanding that it turn over information that might 
implicate the officers in human rights abuse.  
 
Interestingly, for each country, HRW gives an overview of the human rights 
situation, and then devotes an entire section of the report, “The Role of the International 
Community,” to describing that country’s relation to the world around it: the United 
Nations, the United States, Europe, and neighboring countries. Whereas Amnesty 
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International wanted to fight equally hard for each individual person, and Freedom House 
referred primarily to the local context, HRW is externally referent in terms of prioritizing 
and understanding violations within a global context. They do, however, use examples of 
individuals to illustrate general principles, a mixture of stockpiling and storytelling 
techniques. 
 
Many of the loans pledged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (U.S. $198 
million), and the World Bank (U.S. $150 million) remained suspended due to the 
lack of progress on anti-corruption efforts.  
 
The European Union, under public pressure to show more progress from its 
human rights dialogues with China--nine had taken place since 1997--made 
public in January a set of objectives including China’s ratification of U.N. 
covenants, cooperation with U.N. human rights mechanisms, restrictions on the 
use of the death penalty, and international access to prisoners in Tibet and 
Xinjiang.  
 
The ties to the external world that are posited by HRW extend beyond the response of 
outside entities to their culpability. The group calls other countries to task for failings and 
lack of improvement in the home country. 
 
The Clinton administration continued its efforts to broker peace talks between 
Israel and the PA even in its final weeks. […] The Bush administration 
conspicuously declined to replicate the same level of involvement in trying to 
bring the two sides together and confined itself to promoting the 
recommendations of the Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, whose report 
was issued on April 30.  
 
Finally, as to the outlook, HRW carries by far the most neutral tone throughout its 
reports, even though all three organizations claim to strive for objectivity. Much like a 
newspaper article might, they seem careful to present signs of both progress and 
setback… or neither. For example, the report describes a China-E.U. summit during 
which the “two sides affirmed their interest in continuing the human rights dialogue, 
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although Zhu insisted that China’s human rights record was the best it had ever been.” 
The outlook seems neither particularly hopeful nor particularly grim, but a detached 
presentation of “just the facts." 
The “Black Box”: Organizing and Recording Information 
From the same data-gathering techniques applied to the same local situations, 
these three NGOs have arrived at very different conclusions—or perhaps, similar 
conclusions in very different clothes. Bruce Montgomery of the University of Colorado 
notes that “NGOs active in international human rights represent not one, but a 
constellation of causes, purposes, ideologies, and constituencies” (Montgomery, 1996, p. 
88). These causes and purposes appear to drastically affect the data gathered as it filters 
through the HURIDOCS model in Figure 1 to become knowledge. One could infer from 
wide variation in discourse among human rights NGOs that the analysis and 
organizing/recording practices of these agencies might, in fact, be very different after the 
initial fact-finding phases—in fact, it seems altogether likely that the middle steps can 
account in large part for the discrepancy in outcomes. It is to these middle steps that I 
now turn. 
The HURIDOCS organization has attempted to develop Events Standard Formats, 
or ESFs (Dueck et al., 2001; Dueck et al., 2002), for human rights violations so that 
NGOs can standardize their data during the organizing and recording phase. In this 
section, I examine whether these formats account for the transformations in human rights 
information found between the input and output ends of the model, or indeed, whether the 
formats could support such diversity of outcomes at all. Does the very concept of a data 
standard for human rights imply a rigidity of interpretation that would impede the 
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rhetorical work that these organizations seem so eager to carry out? 
The ESFs are more or less an enormous entity-relationship diagram that can be 
used to design databases to capture information about victims, perpetrators, events, and 
their relationships. The authors explain: 
 
This […] is a tool for the quest of truth. With it, it is possible to compile 
comprehensive data that tell in the most minute detail what became of a single 
victim. It is equally possible to compile comprehensive data that tell what 
happened to a whole country. [emphasis mine] (Dueck et al., 2001, p. v)  
 
A typical format for a typical event, for example, has an entity representing “person in 
the role of perpetrator” (a person who is not wholly or indefinitely identified as the 
perpetrator, but who, in the case of this specific event, filled that role).  
The ESF authors openly acknowledge that there are a great many difficulties in 
any effort to standardize such sensitive information on such a grand scale (Luey, 2001). 
These difficulties include variation in the organizations themselves, in the data they 
collect, and in their practices; some of these are outlined here, and most of them have 
been discussed above. 
 
• Organisations have different mandates and orientations 
• The level of expertise varies between human rights organisations 
• Organisations have a variety of confidentiality requirements 
• The types of violations vary 
• The reliability of information varies 
• The “truth” of an event is relative 
• Language and concepts vary 
 
HURIDOCS is attempting to develop a system that splits the difference, something that 
most organizations can use with some training, but little drastic modification. 
The ESFs contain 114 unique data elements.2 See Table 2 for a summary of their 
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characteristics. Of these, 35 are qualitative and 79 quantitative. Qualitative elements 
included several kinds of data. The most common were narrative descriptions, in which 
users can enter a large amount of text freely. (The capacity of these elements was tested 
up to 6000 characters in the Microsoft Access version of the ESFs; the manual states that 
the capacity is unlimited.) Short descriptions are used to house data about things like 
individuals’ job titles or user-generated titles for events. Associated work fields contain 
pointers to external records that have some bearing on an event, such as medical records 
or court documents (presumably, a user would use these to enter a citation). Finally, 
name fields were used for records about people involved in events, as well as people 
responsible for maintaining the records. 
The 79 quantitative fields were largely driven by a number of controlled 
vocabularies, also developed by HURIDOCS. They are quantitative in the sense that they 
could potentially yield categorical statistical data, of the type “X number of torture acts 
were committed in 2002, but there were Y in 2003.” The vocabulary elements are nearly 
evenly split between elements allowing multifaceted input (e.g., a person’s ethnic 
background) and those allowing only a single choice (e.g., the current status of the 
organization’s intervention for an event). Several of the vocabularies driving these 
elements were arranged hierarchically, so that a user must drill down through the 
taxonomy to find the appropriate term for “Type of Act”. Interestingly, eleven of the 
elements that used controlled vocabularies appeared blank upon first use, because the 
fields were available for local customization (e.g., local geographic regions or dialects). 
A few of the controlled vocabularies were actually ordinal data in disguise, such as rating 
the “Reliability of Source” from unreliable to highly reliable. The remainder of the 
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quantitative data consisted of dates and integers, although the integer fields (e.g., 
“Number of Dependents”) were free text and not restricted to numeric data entry. 
Table 2. 
Classification of Events Standard Formats elements 
CATEGORY # ELEMENT DESCRIPTION 
35 qualitative elements 19 narrative description 
 8 short description 
 4 associated work 
 4 name 
79 quantitative elements 32 controlled vocabulary, multifaceted 
     (9 locally defined) 
 30 controlled vocabulary, single 
     (2 locally defined) 
 8 date 
 4 controlled vocabulary, ordinal ranking 
 4 Integer (entered as free text) 
  1 binary 
TOTAL 114  
 
Notwithstanding my characterizations of the Events Standard Formats elements as 
“qualitative” or “quantitative,” the vast majority of the data in these records are textual. 
Further, some of it is free-textual: users are able to enter narrative data of any length to 
describe elements like an overview of what happened during the entire act, the 
psychological effects of an act for the victim, and the conditions during detention—things 
that must really be told, rather than summarized, to be understood. Even the quantitative 
elements allow for a great deal of interpretive flexibility, because so many of them are 
multifaceted. Additionally, nearly every controlled vocabulary element is linked to a 
clarifying note that can be used to explain which terms were chosen and why. It would be 
entirely possible to select two completely contradictory choices from a vocabulary menu, 
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with a note to explain that the different interpretations were offered by different sources. 
The ESFs have many characteristics that most human rights NGOs would find 
highly desirable, even essential, in a data standard. For example, the same person can 
play different roles (victim or perpetrator) in different acts. Acts and events may be 
linked in chains or sets, and the relationship among them can be characterized in 
numerous ways: they can precede, cause, or respond to each other. The standards account 
in some part for varying levels of reliability, availability, and confidentiality of data, but 
only in quantitative ways. Reliability is measured on a one-to-five scale, and data is either 
confidential or not, known or unknown: shades of grey are not allowed here. The ability 
to leave clarification notes on so many specific elements is a definite plus; however, there 
is no indication to show when a note has been left (the user must simply click as if to 
leave a new note in order to view previous notes). 
Even with these successes, the standard has its drawbacks. Many of the controlled 
vocabularies are arranged hierarchically and are extremely difficult to navigate. It would 
be virtually impossible for a user to categorize an act as “torture” without knowing the 
names of the three categories above it. Also, the flexibility, taken to an extreme, can yield 
nonsensical records: a person can legally be both the victim and the perpetrator for the 
same act. Also, although there is room for recording narrative data, there are few or no 
ways to exploit it efficiently, short of regurgitating a copy of it in a report. 
These elements, when it comes down to it, are standardized only in part:  they 
offer a common vocabulary for the common information elements that may need to be 
included about different kinds of entities (people, acts, or otherwise). They do not, 
however, pigeonhole one’s view of an act or event, so that organizations are forced to 
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create a “standard,” non-revisable, Westernized view of that act, to be propagated 
globally to other human rights NGOs as “the way it really happened.” The ESFs can 
contain all the nuance of interpretation, varying sense of purpose, and rhetoric that is 
evidenced in the later pieces of communication that NGOs produce from the data 
recorded in the system. HURIDOCS meant for its ESF structures to be flexible and 
universally adoptable. It appears, in fact, that they may have been largely successful at it. 
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LOOKING AHEAD: A PORTRAIT OF A STANDARD 
In applying the theoretical framework just described to the case of human rights 
information, it appears that the discourse of human rights NGOs shows clear attempts to 
keep “wet” information about events in specific locales as wet as possible. Whether 
through the use of storytelling, stockpiling, or mixed techniques, the three organizations 
in this paper use very idiosyncratic and contextual perspectives to make their 
interpretations. The “wetness” varies among organizations; some, like Amnesty 
International, go so far as to maintain a view into the context of individual events, even in 
annual reports, the most thoroughly analyzed and generalized works published by these 
NGOs. But even in the Freedom House reports, the least “wet” of the set that I studied, 
the organization works hard to place events within a historical, political, and especially 
local context. 
The HURIDOCS Events Standard Formats make wet information about 
individual events a little bit drier. (After all, what good is a standard that has not been 
formalized?) These standards force organizations to do two things: to characterize the 
local data they have gathered in terms that their colleagues around the (English-speaking) 
world could understand, through the use of controlled vocabularies; and to include the 
same kinds of information about the same kinds of entities in their reporting. Within this 
framework, though, the ESF creators attempt to accommodate local knowledge and the 
messiness of real life.  
In this case, the transformation between data input (steps 1 and 3) and 
   45
communicative output (steps 5 and 6) seems not to lie—at least not wholly—at the 
organizing and recording phase. Once recorded, the “black box” transformation has 
probably already taken place. The main difference between the beginning and end of the 
information management cycle in Figure 1 probably stems from differences in 
interpretation and analysis that occur between data gathering and data recording. The 
critical choices happen at step 3. Once the data is fit for input into the ESFs, several 
decisions have already been made about how events will ultimately be characterized to 
the viewing, listening, and reading public. The tension between maintaining data that 
supports local interpretive work, on the one hand, and sharing data that is both 
universally understandable and still meaningful, on the other, is one that the ESFs have 
only partially solved. 
In fact, perhaps HURIDOCS has worked too hard to allow for local perspective, 
depth, and nuance in its events standards. If the ESFs allow for nearly unlimited 
flexibility—if what is put into the system already carries the noticeable stamp of a single 
organization’s interpretation—how useful is it to share that data with other organizations? 
Would an organization even be able to perceive when it imported data about an act 
already in its records from another source? Would data from one organization be of a 
quality or nature sufficient for reconstruction to suit the rhetorical purposes of another? 
The problem, I think, lies in HURIDOCS’ attempt to mix stockpiling and 
storytelling within its data standards. The fence sitting approach currently used by 
HURIDOCS is a remarkable and promising start, but it does not fully account for the 
local interpretations and practices of individual organizations, nor does it adequately 
prepare data to be usable for numerous organizations simultaneously. Too many of its 
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elements are, in fact, too wet to be of use outside the context within which the data was 
gathered. Comments about reliability or confidentiality, to say nothing of narrative 
descriptions of events, are too variable across organizations to merit their inclusion in a 
data-sharing standard. 
A further danger lies in the creation of hyper-formalized information systems 
imparted to NGOs from agents outside their organization, however good the intentions of 
these agents. These systems may, in fact, have little to do with the actual information that 
is used most frequently by the people in the organization. Instead, systems that are meant 
to be industry standards may contain data that has little in common with the real work 
being done; such data may be maintained solely to share with outsiders and, therefore, 
half-heartedly. Ultimately, poor fit defeats the purpose of standards, which must be used 
to be useful. From the outside, there appears to be reasonably good fit between the data in 
the HURIDOCS standards and the information contained in the annual reports of NGOs. 
But, as mentioned above, I do not know which, if any, NGOs actually use the 
HURIDOCS standards, or how “fit” would be perceived by the people doing the work. 
Of the 114 elements in the ESFs, how many are actually useful to—let alone already used 
in—every human rights NGO? 
Generally, a less intrusive and more universal data standard might use a smaller 
set of stockpiling-based data. Individual organizations could then decide how to 
counterweight the shared data with the stories they find to be appropriate. A mini-
standard might be created within the ESFs to contain a very few select pieces of the driest 
information by which a particular act could be accurately and uniquely identified: names 
of people involved, type of alleged act, approximate dates. This would be a purer form of 
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stockpiling, but one that need not necessarily prey to the standard criticisms of 
stockpiling and formalization. The anti-utopian danger here would be in letting the data 
speak for itself as gospel truth, e.g., as in a report that tallied up the faceless numbers and 
decried the fact that violations jumped ten percent in one year. Rather, the point of a 
barebones data standard would be to share this driest of information for use as a jumping-
off point for unique local investigations and interpretations. It would allow organizations 
to share the burden of gathering information without inflicting too much of their internal 
analysis on each other. In this view, only the least contestable data would be shared, with 
an eye toward organizations themselves being responsible for the subsequent layering of 
understanding—a layering that they willingly perform already. 
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NOTES 
1 All reports were accessed online in November 2002; thus, page numbers are not 
available for direct quotes. Please see the bibliography entry under each NGO’s entire 
annual report for specific country section URLs. 
2 The official count in the manual is higher. However, the manual counts each 
instance of an element as a separate element: e.g., “Remarks” in the person record and 
“Remarks” on the act record are counted separately. Additionally, the “Person Name” 
element generated a controlled vocabulary for other “X Name” elements. For purposes of 
my analysis, both these kinds of element groupings were counted as a single element. 
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